In addition to this paper, the DTD has also developed more detailed "focus" papers that share insights and best practices for various specific challenges such as mission command and cross-domain synergy, assessments, CCIR development and reporting, and lethal and nonlethal integration observed at joint headquarters.
War Plans To be understood, On War really has to be approached as a whole, but the intelligent reader needs to keep in mind that various sections reflect different stages in Clausewitz's intellectual and theoretical evolution. Books One, Two, and Eight are generally considered the most important and the most nearly "finished" especially Book Onewhile older parts sometimes fail to connect with Clausewitz's most mature ideas.
Some sections are often left out of abridged versions, especially Books Five, Six, and Seven, allegedly because they are tactical in nature and thus obsolete. This sometimes leads to serious misunderstandings of Clausewitz's arguments, for it is precisely in these books that he works out the practical implications of his ideas.
For those who prefer to paint Clausewitz as the "apostle of the offensive," it is especially convenient to leave out Book Six, "Defense"—by far the largest, which demonstrated Clausewitz's controversial conviction that defense is inherently the stronger form of war.
One of the main sources of confusion about Clausewitz's approach lies in his dialectical method of presentation. For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is merely a continuation of Politik," while accurate as far as it goes, was not intended as a statement of fact.
It is the antithesis in a dialectical argument whose thesis is the point—made earlier in the analysis—that "war is nothing but a duel [or wrestling match, a better translation of the German Zweikampf] on a larger scale.
This synthesis resolves the deficiencies of the two earlier bald statements, indicating that war is neither "nothing but" an act of brute force nor "merely" a rational act of politics or policy. Rather, it is a dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation on all sides.
Identifying precisely who was to benefit from reading On War, and precisely how, are perplexing questions. Clausewitz's practical purpose in writing included providing "military analysts" with a clear conceptual scheme for understanding war, in hopes of improving both its actual conduct and the literature discussing it.
He hoped that such an understanding would improve the judgement of military commanders, but he also believed that "military genius" was more a matter of character, personality, and temperament than of intellect.
Perhaps because of his awareness of his own character, he felt that intellectuals generally made poor commanders. Only a self-conscious intellectual, however, was likely to wrestle with a book like On War. One of the deepest explorations of Clausewitz's intentions is provided by historian Jon Sumida in his Decoding Clausewitz: University Press of Kansas, Sumida's interpretation is discussed below under the heading "Clausewitz on History and Military History.
Sumida asks whether it was Clausewitz's goal to provide a phenomenology of war—that is to say, a description of the essential nature of armed conflict—or to suggest some other route to understanding the problem. These are important distinctions; Sumida emphasizes the latter. But Clausewitz was an eclectic thinker who sought to integrate many diverse aspects of the problem, and it is difficult in practice to separate the two goals.
On War certainly was not intended to provide a practical "cookbook" for commanders in the field. That approach is common in military doctrinal writing, and Clausewitz the practical soldier had himself written and taught doctrine during the Napoleonic Wars.
But it was alien to Clausewitz's concept of military theory. It is meant to assist the student in his efforts at self-education and to help him develop his own judgement, "just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.
Knowledge, he knew, was not ability, and abstract education must always be accompanied by practical experience. No theory, no general, should have anything to do with psychological and philosophical sophistries.
Actual experience always took precedence over the kind of abstract "truth" that can be transmitted by mere writing. Theory must never conflict with reality, and thus must be essentially descriptive of war, never prescriptive of action.
Clausewitz on History and Military History To understand On War, to distinguish it from Clausewitz's earlier works, and to differentiate his ideas from those of other theorists, one must understand Clausewitz's evolving attitude towards history. Alone, his historical studies of Napoleonic campaigns would probably not have altered his approach to theory.
As time went on, however, he also made detailed studies of earlier and quite different wars. These included seventeenth-century campaigns like those of Gustavus Adolphus and Turenne, the War of the Spanish Successionand eastern European wars with the Turks.
Thus On War reflects a much wider range of historical experience and a much more sophisticated approach to history as a discipline than did the earlier "Principles of War. Clausewitz, along with broader historical philosophers like Hegel and Ranke, did much to shape our modern understanding of historical inquiry itself.
As Sumida notes, Clausewitz's ideas on "historical reenactment" prefigure the much later ideas of English-language historical theorist R. For an excellent appreciation of Clausewitz as a historical innovator, see Sumida's recent works on Clausewitz.
Sumida argues and, with some caveats, I tend to concur with him that On War is essentially "about learning how to do something—namely, how to exercise supreme command in war. His rejection of these approaches was based on his conviction that effective command performance in war—and especially at the level of strategic decision—is the product of genius.
Genius, defined as the command capability of the commander in chief, consists of a combination of rational intelligence and subrational intellectual and emotional faculties that make up intuition. Intuition, in particular, becomes the agent of decision in the face of difficult circumstances such as inadequate information, great complexity, high levels of contingency, and severe negative consequences in the event of failure.
Clausewitz had observed that during the Napoleonic Wars, intuition had been improved by experience.Free article analysis papers, essays, and research papers. Modern Warfare - Modern warfare ranges from small to large campaigns with military fundamentals shaping the battlefield.
However, none has a more significant value as the Napoleonic eras. Although France is no longer a dominant power, its military fundamentals . The Importance of Distance in Modern Warfare. John Govern | May 16, Share on Facebook Share.
remote weapons systems have adapted warfare to man. The articles and other content which appear on the Modern War Institute website are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not . Yale Law Journal; Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, by David C.
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Only at ashio-midori.com". Military professionals, through their study of war and warfare in width, depth, and context as well as through discussion and debate in a variety of forums can help identify changes in the character of conflict as well as underscore important continuities in the nature of war.
Consider these continuities, for example: First, war is political.